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The rapid development in computer technology in the
past two decades has focused attention by countries on
the need to modernize and update their legal and
administrative capabilities. The advent of digital
evidence has become commonplace as people and
entities respond to legitimate business transactions.
The prevalence of abuse has focused attention on the
development of mechanisms to respond to cyber crimes
and computer related interferences. Digital evidence
may be considered any information of a probative
nature that is stored, transmitted or retrieved in a binary
form. The format of digital evidence consists of ones
and zeros of electricity. As such, digital evidence is
beyond the conventional computer based information,
extending to the analogue format of audio and video
productions, although all are rapidly becoming digital as
well.
The International Narcotics Control Board1 has
repeatedly cautioned that committing a crime in an
electronic environment (cyber crime) is easy. Few
resources are required to obtain access to and use the
internet. The personal dangers for the criminal and the
likelihood of detection are reduced, because cyber
crimes are difficult to investigate and prosecute. The
use of digital evidence has proliferated in the past
decades. Courts have permitted prosecuting authorities
to obtain access to e-mails, digital photographs, word
documents, instant messaging, spreadsheets, internet
browsers, hotel electronic door keys, automatic teller
machine slips and global positioning schedules. The
reality is that new rules have not developed at a
sufficient pace to cope with the existing realities.
Accordingly, existing rules designed for physical and
conventional investigations are applied and stretched to
cover the reception of digital evidence.
Authentication
All evidence, including digital evidence, demands that a
proper foundation must be presented for its reception.
Courts are overtly interested with the reliability of
digital evidence. In the 1977 eighth circuit case of United
States of America v Scholle,2 Henley, J suggested that
‘the complex nature of computer storage’ called for
authentication of digital evidence to have a ‘more
comprehensive foundation’. However, by 1982 as the
reception of digital evidence had become commonplace,
Clark, CJ of the fifth circuit in United States of America v
Vela,3 reiterated a comment made in Rosenberg v
Collins, 624 F.2d at 665, that ‘this court has previously
held that “computer data complications … should be
treated as any other record of regularly conducted
activity.”’.
Authentication measures allow network operators and
regulatory authorities to trace electronic routes,
although they cannot identify persons, for which see the
successful defence in the German cases of OLG Köln, 19
U 16/02; LG Konstanz, 2 O 141/01 A; AG Erfurt, 28 C
2354/01,4 in these 3 related cases, the seller was not
able to prove that the buyers were the ones that entered
into the contract on-line. However, biometric
measurements may serve to authenticate individuals
through the capture of unique data characterizing
physical features of a person. Examples include a
persons’ finger or palm print, a laser scan of the retina
and a voice point.
Record keeping
Electronic record keeping in e-commerce transactions
provides a helpful service for suspicious activities in
cyberspace. Information on the nature of network traffic
allows the understanding of broad trends in how people
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obtain access to web sites. Record keeping is achieved
through service logs, which register the trail of on-line
transactions, the duration of on-line sessions and the
identification of network address for business
transactions. Basic information would be subjected to
profiling techniques whereby patterns of transactional
activities may be detected.
Search and seizure 
The case of Vladimir Levin,5 in which computer hackers
in St. Petersburg, Russia hacked into Citibank
computers in the USA and transferred substantial funds,
illustrated the new reality of digital evidence. This was a
modern day bank theft that required no physical
attendance, weapons, masks or a get-away vehicle. The
fact that Levin was able to use his computers via several
intermediaries and transfer substantial funds, shows
innovative solutions are demanded. A collection of all
related computer information for a search encounters
challenges. Evidence collection is frequently
interrupted, as few ISP administrators maintain
comprehensive log records and registers. Invariably,
records considered routine are deleted, as storage
space is critical to network speed and capacity.
Fraudsters are known to target intermediary computers
that maintain inadequate or no record. Such lax records
retard investigations and prosecutions of cyber
offending.
In common law jurisdictions such as England and
Wales, both prior to and after the passing of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, it has been trite law
that the police may not ransack a person’s home to look
generally for evidence against him. A lawful entry into
premises for a search and seizure must always relate to
a specified purpose, and the search must be consistent
with the stated purpose. In the USA, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
establishes a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
conduct of all searches.
The collection of digital evidence is paramount once
the electronic trail leads to the offending computers.
Digital evidence specialists have developed routine
procedures on the seizure of an offenders’ computer.
Usually the machine is taken away from the location for
examination. The justification for off site inspection is
based on practical considerations. Most computers have
large hard drives of 20-60 gigabytes. Even a routine
examination would take considerable time, since most
files may be suspicious or mislabeled to conceal their
content. At the computer examination, forensic analysts
could create a bit stream or mirror image of the hard
drive. The bit stream copy is an exact duplicate and not
mere files. Each bit and byte stored on the hard drive is
duplicated for accuracy. The forensic examiner would
use the copy for interrogation thereby preventing the
original from damage.
A broad range of techniques may be employed by the
analyst. For example, a string search may be executed
for particular extensions or phrases including text links
to the search. Secondly, all files with similar
characteristics may be opened or sampled for the object
of the search. Any nexus to the suspect will be explored
from the hard drive to incriminate or link the offence to
the suspect. In United States v Grey,6 child pornography
was found during a search under a warrant. The items
were held admissible although the defendant argued
that the files marked with JPG extensions were
presumptively pictures and not related to the subject of
the search. The courts ruled that hackers frequently
mislabel files and the FBI was not required to take file
names at face value.
The existing rules of criminal procedure have been
developed over the years to cope with physical realities
such as murder, rapes, burglaries and thefts. Current
rules of collection of evidence cater largely for eye
witnesses, what is seen, observed, touched and felt. As
such the rules on search and seizure in common law
jurisdictions have limited the scope of evidence
collection. Searches are confined to persons and places.
For example, police officers cannot require an individual
to undress in public regardless of any suspicions they
may have. Searches when authorized, especially by
warrants, are circumscribed by consent, statutory
authority or the existence of reasonable suspicion
based on objective criteria. Seizure involves a
meaningful interference with the possessory interest in
property of another and is justified in certain
circumstances. Collection of abandoned property is not
seizure. Time limitation on such interference of property
is crucial in the determination of its justification for
seizure.
The third party
The advent of the digital environment has spawned new
realities that challenge the existing structure. The
collection of digital evidence from third parties has
opened interesting opportunities for law enforcement
and regulatory bodies. In the United Kingdom, the
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Interception of Communications Act 1985, Drug
Trafficking Act 1994, Security Services Act 1989 and
recent prevention of terrorism legislation invariably
make provision for the collection of intelligence on an ex
parte basis. Review is subject to the judiciary, but
intercepts of electronic communications exist for
justifiable causes of national security and prevention of
crime. Various threshold requirements must be satisfied
that aim to balance privacy concerns. However, the
result is that a subpoena, court order or interception
order can be used to obtain digital evidence from a third
party. ISP administrators are generally cooperative, as
they are innocent third parties providing a service. The
abuse of the electronic platform for offending removes
any reasonable expectation of privacy from the offender.
Moreover, no issue of self-incrimination as incorporated
in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the USA
arises. ISP administrators may find it easier and less
burdensome to comply by handing over the entire file
with thousands of unrelated correspondences.
Generally, internet users store a good deal of private
information on remote servers. Such information is
easily accessible to ISP administrators who could read
private e-mails, stored files and examine access logs
that record the surfing of individuals on the World Wide
Web. The ability to produce disclosure from the ISP can
be equal to viewing the entire private world of an
individual on-line. Such disclosure can relate to multiple
accounts of subscribers without their knowledge or
consent. As a result, investigators in the digital world
can obtain disclosure of the entire profiles and surfing
sites of individuals. The employment of subpoenas,
court orders or intelligence interception orders without
consent once statutory justification exists, is
permissible.
Moreover, the use of prospective surveillance has
allowed for the search of an individual suspect that
accords with constitutional and statutory justification.
The use of an intermediary through whom a hacker has
passed is justifiable. As for example, in the Levin case,
the fact that the hackers invaded several intermediary
computers could result in a trail placed to monitor him
in the future. The fact that the systems of innocent
parties might be violated by hackers, enables the
installation of monitoring filters with the consent of the
third party to identify and trace future unwarranted
incursions.
Existing surveillance monitors can identify the type of
traffic, such as e-mails or messages. Filters could
identify specific words or phrases along with internet
addresses. However, filters cannot make judgments or
exercise discretion as to what is private or public
information. The binary characters of internet
information in zeros and ones challenge not merely the
technology but the ability to deduct its content. The
context of the information along with the identification
of the sender and receiver are usually not susceptible to
affirmative proof. This provides an added challenge to
the protection afforded by the law against unreasonable
searches and seizure. However in Halford v United
Kingdom,7 Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights was held to protect the telephone calls
made on a telephone specifically provided for personal
use from the business premises at Merseyside Police
Headquarters.
Safeguards
The seemingly unchartered right of investigators to
compel disclosure in search and seizure powers for
digital evidence must be addressed. Claims for privacy
and civil liberties as afforded by the constitutional and
statutory powers have a role in the digital world. The
tradition in common law jurisdictions is that searches
must be executed when authorized within a reasonable
time. For digital evidence there is no such implication,
but it is relative due to the volume of documents and
files to be scanned. Seized property must be returned if
there is no charge filed or offence committed. In cases
of physical evidence, courts have affirmed the need for
fairness in the absence of search warrants. Usually a
search warrant may be obtained upon sworn
information. There is no need for a charge to be filed.
Real evidence arising from a search may provide
justification for a charge to be filed.
In AG v Williams,8 the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council emphasized that the judge or magistrate who
issues a search warrant must be satisfied that the
applicant for such a warrant has reasonable grounds for
suspicion. The magistrates must satisfy the appropriate
legal threshold prior to the issue of a search warrant.
Further evidence obtained in pursuit of the specified
object of the search warrant may be excluded if not
relevant. The plain view exception as applied in the USA
gives investigators wide latitude to obtain evidence of
other crimes once the search was consistent with the
execution of the warrant. Digital evidence is no
different, and allows for even intrusive and wide ranging
searches of hard drives over prolonged periods. The test
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of relevance for admissibility in criminal proceedings is
equally applicable in the digital world.
However, some courts have begun to take a more
measured view of digital search and seizure. Emphasis
is being placed on the nature and extent of the
information needed rather than on the location of the
evidence. The content of public and private spaces for
searches is immediately relevant for physical searches.
By contrast, searches and seizures of digital evidence
has less to do with public and private location but rather
the purpose of the information. In the case of In re
Search of 3817 W. West End, First Floor Chicago, Illinois
60621,9 Magistrate Judge Schenkier refused the
government’s request for the unchartered search of a
home computer. The law enforcement authorities were
required to undertake to follow a pre-approved protocol
in a tax fraud case. The court reasoned that the absence
of such approval would confer a license to roam through
everything on the computer without limitation and
appropriate standards. The need for a pre-approved
protocol was justified on the basis of four conditions:10
First, it is frequently the case with computers that the
normal sequence of “search” and then selective
“seizure” is turned on its head. Because of the
difficulties of conducting an on-site search of
computers, the government frequently seeks (and, as
here, obtains), authority to seize computers without
any prior review of their contents.
Second, that is significant in this case because of the
substantial likelihood that the computer contains an
“intermingling” of documents evidencing the alleged
tax fraud, with documents that the government has
no probable cause to seize.
Third, we consider the extraordinary volume of
information that may be stored even on a home
computer. ….. The capacity of the computer to store
these large quantities of information increases the
risk that many of the intermingled documents will
have nothing to do with the alleged criminal activity
that creates the probable cause for a search and
seizure.
Fourth, while computers present the possibility of
confronting far greater volumes of documents than
are typically presented in a paper document search,
computers also present the tools to refine searches
in ways that cannot be done with hard copy files. ……
computer technology affords a variety of methods by
which the government may tailor a search to target
on the documents which evidence the alleged
criminal activity. These methods include limiting the
search by date range; doing key word searches;
limiting the search to text files or graphics files; and
focusing on certain software programs. See Carey,
172 F.3d at 1276. Of course, these are not the
exclusive means of focusing a computer search, and
they are not the means that might be appropriate in
every case. But, the existence of these tools
demonstrates the ability of the government to be
more targeted in its review of computer information
than it can be when reviewing hard copy documents
in a file cabinet.
Accordingly, a new method may arise in which search
and seizure of digital evidence may be subjected to time
limits, such as, for example, 30 days or shorter periods
as warranted. Moreover, the approach of law
enforcement and regulatory authorities to retain seized
computers and equipment for prolonged periods may
be ending. Time limits as well as the need to return
property in a useable manner after timely investigations
should become the new standard.
Further, the retention of bit streams and copies of the
hard drives of suspects should be governed by a new
regime. Physical evidence is required to be returned and
samples taken such as fingerprints or DNA tissues
should be destroyed. Such destruction is common,
although not in the UK, especially when suspects are
exonerated or eliminated from an investigation. In most
cases, copies of digital evidence are retained after the
conclusion of an investigation. The existing rules are
applied to physical evidence from a propriety point of
view. Copies of digital evidence are not considered as
such once the original hard drives, discs or CDs are
returned to the owner. As such, enhanced protocols are
needed to address the current realities in the digital
area.
Reforms 
The search and seizure of digital evidence raise added
concerns about the technical and resource challenges
presented by computer encryption. Encryption is largely
designed to ensure privacy and freedom of expression
as a basic civil rights issue. The future of search and
seizure of digital evidence should be marked by the
following conditions:
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(1) Public education such as information on web sites
and the media on the harmful effects of financial
crimes, child pornography and narcotics related
substances.
(2) Development of software programs to track
electronic transactions whereby an audit trail
would be established for on-line commerce.
(3) Alliances must be forged by law enforcement and
regulatory authorities with the private sector to
combat high-tech crimes to ensure confidence in
the market.
(4) Widespread adoption of model legislation for
cyber crimes such as European Convention on
Cybercrime and the United Nations Convention
against Corruption.
(5) Enhanced investigative techniques such as
prospective surveillance through innocent parties
whose system was violated, for example a public
library or museum.
(6)  Effective compliance and oversight of law
enforcement and regulatory authorities to report
to courts or supervising bodies in order to
minimize over-intensive surveillance.
Conclusion
The existing rules of evidence collection, especially the
search and seizure regime, is largely designed for
physical evidence and eyewitness accounts. The advent
of digital evidence has seen innovative measures to
adopt existing rules to the electronic frontier. The result
has been mixed, with measured success and outright
violations that constitutional and statutory protections
were designed to confer. A new ethos is required with
the accent away from proprietary interest to the nature
of the information sought and the technology in use to
obtain it. The current review of the electronic world in
much of the Anglophone world must address three
major themes:
(1) The extent to which existing laws on search and
seizure are sufficient to cope with unlawful
conduct on the internet.
(2) To what extent new technologies, tools,
capabilities or legal authorities could be used for
effective investigation and prosecution of cyber
conduct, especially the search and seizure regime.
(3) The role of education and public awareness to
reduce cyber offending and enhance the reception
of digital evidence.
The existence of digital evidence is a reality in 2008.
There must be wide support for self regulation and the
development of cyber ethics by ISPs and web hosts.
Such self-regulation will lead to greater compliance with
evolving standards and uniform conduct. As such,
information will become more accessible and reduce the
level and intensity of invasive monitoring and intrusions
into civil liberties. The rules on search and seizure for
digital evidence would, in reality, become routine and
standardized as the existing regime relating to physical
evidence.
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